Middle East Network Blog

Gershon Baskin
JERUSALEM—Sixty years! Rising from the ashes and faced with six decades of struggle and war, Israel certainly has a lot to be proud of. Not only is Israel one of the world’s largest producers of news and interests around the world –given our size and the problems we face –but Israel has emerged to be a leading nation in so many fields—agriculture, water technology, high-tech, medical treatment and research, bio-technology, communications, and more. Recently, even Israel’s film industry has attracted international attention and fame. I look forward to our Independence Day celebrations every year. I am proud and pleased that we have this day to celebrate.

Many organisations on the far left have begun to combine Independence Day celebrations with ceremonies to mark the Palestinian Nakba—their national day of tragedy. There are some on the radical left who even call for boycotting Independence Day entirely. While I am considered a veteran "leftist" by many, I will not be there with those who suggest that we should not celebrate our day of independence.

Several times a year, Jewish, Christian and Muslim holidays take place around the same dates. It is customary for me to receive good wishes from many Palestinians and to wish them happy holidays in return. One of the more humorous of these is the annual Pesach greeting I receive from a Fatah leader, who extends his wishes in the traditional Jewish form: Wishing you a happy and a kosher Pesach!

On Independence Day 2001, at the height of the second Intifada, I received a call from a Palestinian friend in Bethlehem, who wished me a Happy Independence Day. This was a first for me. I was literally dumbfounded. I am not often at a loss for words—but I was taken off guard and didn’t know what to say. One year later, being prepared for his phone call, I was able to respond with "I hope that you too will soon be able to celebrate your independence!"

I will be very happy to see the day when the Palestinians have their own Independence Day to celebrate. That day, too, will be a celebration for Israel and for Zionism. Today, being pro-Israel by definition must mean that one is also pro-Palestinian. The fate and future of these two peoples depends on their ability to find a way to live side-by-side in peace—in two separate states. George W. Bush has challenged us to reach agreement by the end of his term in January 2009. At the same time, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will also be finishing his term of office. No one knows for sure when Ehud Olmert will face the end of his term.

Negotiations are ongoing, but there are contradictory reports on their progress. If no agreement is reached by the end of the terms of the two Presidents, it is unlikely Abbas will seek another term. Even if he did seek another term, without an agreement in hand, it is unlikely that he would win an election. The most likely political scenario for Palestine without an agreement is the development of what the Palestinians call "fitna," or chaos. Fitna will include more intifada, more violence, more suffering, and very likely the rise of Hamas in the West Bank as well.

The only clear potential Palestinian leader in the eyes of the public after Abbas is Marwan Barghouti, who is serving five consecutive life sentences in an Israeli prison. If the Palestinian territories do break down into renewed fighting and violence, it is very unlikely that any Israeli leader would consider releasing Barghouti. Of course, nothing is impossible, and unfortunately we have learned in our history that Israeli leaders often make decisions under violence that they refused to make under much better circumstances (e.g. disengagement from Gaza unilaterally rather than as part of a negotiated agreement).

According to the public mood in Israel today, and from public opinion research, it seems apparent that without an agreement in hand, Olmert stands little-to-no chance of winning an election. Binyamin Netanyahu is the most likely next prime minister in Israel. There seems little chance that Netanyahu would succeed in negotiations where Olmert failed. If the moderate Abbas is no longer in charge, and there is fitna or a Hamas takeover, the chances for the two-state solution would diminish beyond hope, and Israel would find itself in the tragic situation of continuing to rule over territories and a people that it has no desire to occupy.

Netanyahu has his theories that if we improve the economic situation of the Palestinians we can buy their quiet. It should be reminded that both Intifadas broke out at times when the Palestinian economy was on the rise and there seemed to be a lot of hope (economically) among most Palestinians. Nonetheless, the hope of economic prosperity was not enough to squash the lack of hope for political freedom and independence. We would have behaved in exactly the same way—we would never rest if our political freedom and independence was being denied to us, even if our pockets were full of money. There are some things money just can’t buy.

This year on Independence Day, the papers are full of articles about the next 60 years. I am more concerned with the next year or two. If we do not find a way to release our control over the Palestinians in the next year or two, then in 10 years, or twenty, we will be celebrating the independence of the state that will emerge here through bloodshed and struggle—a very different state. It will not be a Jewish state. It will not be a Zionist state. It will not be a state where the Jewish people are a majority.

So on this Independence Day I wish wholeheartedly to all of my Palestinian friends: "I hope that you too will soon be able to celebrate your independence!"

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* Gershon Baskin is the Israeli Co-CEO of IPCRI, the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information. This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service (CGNews) and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.<br />
Source: The Jerusalem Post, 5 May 2008, www.jpost.com.<br />Copyright permission is granted for publication.
 

"In accordance with the new law many Syrian lawyers are gathering in order to start establishing arbitration centers. It is still initial meetings but will definitely end up by serious results,” says Hussein Khadour, Middle East Network Member.

 “This article is sent to us and translated by our Iraqi member, Tahrir Altememe.  It demonstrates that mediation is a powerful tool that can be used in even the toughest conflicts.”

Means for settling disputes in the framework of the League of Arab States
Abdul Haq Dhabi
Civilized dialogue - Issue: 1435 - 2006 / 1 / 19

Presented by:

The principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes one of the basic principles on which it was based modern international organization, and specifically since the Peace Conferences years 1899 1907, while the spread of the phenomenon of international regulation during the period loyal to two aforementioned issues gained maintain peace and security and the peaceful settlement of disputes particularly important, since become one of the first targets of any international organization, as there is conviction to the international organization interested in things that there was no strong system and function effectively respect the peaceful settlement of disputes is an important ingredient substantive underlying the international organizations in general in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it.

And the League of Arab States is a regional international organizations, which asserted in its charter the non-use of force to settle disputes between two or more States of the League, has been decided this trend also in the Mutual Defense Treaty and economic cooperation ratified by the Arab League Council in April 1950, and entered into force Year 1952 in the first article of ensuring lasting security and stability and conflict resolution among members peacefully.

With considers any means available to the Arab League to settle disputes? And to what extent they succeed means to achieve a peaceful settlement?

If it was possible to take these two questions is the basis for this study, it is nevertheless not enough to know the reasons that lead or limit the ability of the Arab League to settle disputes that arise among its members, so we see that the design of this study was divided as follows:
-Chapter I: The means of settling disputes in the framework of the League of Arab States.
-The means set forth in the Charter.
-Means enshrined in the Charter.
-Chapter Two: the League of Arab States and the settlement of disputes Arabic - success and failure.
-The success.
-The failure.

Chapter I: The means of settling disputes in the framework of the League of Arab States:


The peaceful settlement of disputes and the non-use of force, threat or use of things become established in the jurisprudence of public international law, and of the basic principles established by the governing international relations.
And undertake international organizations to settle disputes that may occur between nations involved in the membership is logical and necessary, but that was a function essential for the work of these organizations.
The Charter of the United Nations affirmed in article third session on the need to resolve any dispute would continue to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security at risk, seek a solution at the outset in a negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement …
It seems that there are many ways that can be used to settle disputes, there are:
Means of political and diplomatic settlement.
Means of a legal nature or jurisdiction.

Of course, the asylum processes to one of these methods are subject to the desire of management disputing parties, and prefer a means to the other.
It is noticeable that in the creation of the League of Arab States differing views between the commitment that judicial sentences through arbitration (Iraq and Egypt), and among the claimants to preserve the sovereignty of Member States and not compromising the sovereignty (Lebanon), so came the Charter such as the compromise of this difference, but it can be said that side-vision II.

That came to Article V of the Charter deals with the issue of resolving differences between Member States and ways to resolve peacefully with its emphasis on non-recourse to force to settle disputes among the Arab League, more modest than the text of article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. This article was limited to two male and two mediation and arbitration, noting that the Arab League has developed other means of peaceful settlement of disputes.

The means set forth in the Charter.

As already noted, the Charter of the League of Arab States and especially Article V, only to a male and two are mediation and arbitration, and the Mutual Defense Treaty and economic cooperation had not referred to avoid shortages in the Charter:

1 - Mediation: Charter limited the League of Arab States, said political and diplomatic means and allow the interference of the same Arab League in the pacific settlement of a peaceful manner in the form of mediation, noting that the Charter may link the question of a mediation controversy that can evolve and lead to an armed conflict or transpires including the possibility that lead to the outbreak of war between the conflicting parties.
, We can deduce from this that any mediation in any dispute Arabic located outside the Council does not consider, such as mediation conducted by the Arab League, and is an Arab mediation.
And the Charter stipulated that the mediation undertaken by the Arab League to be limited to disputes that feared a war between two-Arab, and this can be taken naturally to the authors of the Charter, it is assumed that post in the international organization as "preventive function," the sense that they should not wait until fears of escalating conflict and then turn into a war.
Not to mention that the mediation occur in the Charter of fundamental feature, namely, that the outcome of reach is not necessarily binding.
Mediation in the end remain friendly initiative by the Council in order to arrive at solutions satisfactory to the parties to the conflict, and things do not belong to the question of the independence of States, territorial integrity or sovereignty.

This, in turn, raises the question broadly, what if accepted by the conflicting parties to resort to the Arab League Council in matters which the Council is entitled to make a decision binding one of the parties did not apply the results of mediation? Especially in light of the absence of express provision deals with such matters.

There is no doubt that this contributes to the weakening of the effectiveness of the peaceful settlement of disputes by the Arab League, the Arab League Council has examined many of the differences in the Arab / Arabic, especially in the border issue, the consideration of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict in 1961, Egyptian-Sudanese conflict, the conflict between two parts of the northern and southern Yemen, and the border dispute between Morocco and Algeria.
Overall, we can say that the mediation (as a political and diplomatic) success depends on many considerations including: the position of the contesting parties, their willingness to enter the Arab League Council, the nature and degree of seriousness of the conflict, and other external influences.

2 - Arbitration: show by reading the text of Article V of the Charter of the League of Arab States, she pointed out by the mediation as a political means to arbitration court with emphasis on arbitration optional and not compulsory, and this means that the issue remains subject to the will and desire of the parties to the conflict, there entitled to the Arab League Council the task of arbitration without consent of the parties concerned a dispute or otherwise, regardless of the degree of seriousness of this conflict and nature.
The identification of the former contributes to the weakening of the role of the Arab League in this area, and the absence of any reference in the Charter to the nature of the penalty that could arise from the parties that have accepted arbitration and then refused to abiding by its resolutions.
And a longer optional nature maintained by the Arab states at the founding of the Arab League, fearing for their independence and national sovereignty (Lebanese position) of the hand, and then authorize a political organ - the Arab League Council - the task of arbitration, and not a judicial, pay some to reject the idea of compulsory arbitration (Iraqi position) considering that this task by the Arab League Council would create a dangerous situation threatens the installation of the Arab League in general.

Means others set forth in the Charter.

Witnessed by the Arab League for sophisticated role in the settlement of disputes Arabic, and the level of use of new techniques beyond the narrow framework set by the Charter means any previous mediation and voluntary arbitration, the Board has retained many of the tools and "tactics", resorted to various disputes offered him the good offices, conciliation and investigation and fact-finding missions.
The Council adopted the method of separation of the conflicting parties by sending a joint Arab forces, it has happened twice in the history of the Arab League: the first was during the Iraqi-Kuwaiti conflict in 1961, known as the troops were sent to Kuwait as the "forces of emergency Arab" or "forces of the Arab League ".
The second time was during the crisis of the Lebanese civil war, where the troops sent known as the "security forces of the Arab League" or "Arab forces symbolic" that has been promoted mostly Arab troop deterrence.
However, the most important means of settling disputes in the Arab-Charter revolve around two principal: Secretary-General, the role of diplomatic summits.

The first paragraph: the political role of the Secretary-General in resolving disputes Arabic.

Determined the post of the Secretary General of the League of Arab States in the light of the texts contained in the Charter of the Arab League and the internal regulations of the Arab League Council and its Secretariat, but in the light of what was actually the work could conclude that the Secretary-General post has witnessed great development, particularly session Political for all Arab issues under pressure circumstances surrounding the Arab League and it has been exposed.
And the Secretary-General had been based on his political role in the settlement of major disputes Arab and Arab mediation between disputing parties to the growing interest in the Arab League - in particular the post of general secretary, and the conviction importance of this office, as one of the factors involved in the administration of various local disputes Arab positively . It also relied Secretary-General to set the texts contained in the rules of procedure of the Arab League Council and the Secretariat in particular Articles 20 and 21 of the Council’s procedure.

The growing role of the Secretary-General significantly, which led to the adoption by the Board in carrying out the functions of mediation, conciliation and instead of good offices, has been hit is made by the Council to the Secretary-General a considerable, as it was entrusted with the whole playing a mediator in many cases, and Secretary-General often his compromise between the parties to the dispute even before the assignment, and the Secretary-General is a necessity imposed by the requirements of his job, for example, be able to draw the attention of the Arab League Council or the Member States to issue any harm to the relations between them, it shall first of Film start to the realities of the situation sufficiently subject of the dispute. He did not hesitate to welcome the Arab League Council at its regular efforts of the Secretary-General’s mediation between the parties to a dispute over the Arab arena, and was often asked to continue to pay those efforts.
This happened, for example, to the border crisis between Yemen and North Yemen South in 1972, the Council passed a resolution to continue the Secretary-General in his efforts to achieve reconciliation with the assistance of two of a special committee composed of representatives of some Member States.
In the Lebanese civil war, Secretary-General did not hesitate to use his allowance to the conflicting parties since the first moment of the outbreak of fighting, and has welcomed the Council at its third regular session, which was sixty efforts of the Secretary-General in this regard.
As well as key roles undertaken by the Secretary-General commissioned by the Council role in the Kuwait crisis in 1961, it was the Secretary-General (Abdul Khaliq Hassouna) a significant role in this crisis, particularly in relation to the establishment and send Arab peacekeeping forces, which was issued by the decision Council.
That the growing role of the Secretary-General in the area of local Arab dispute settlement has emerged very clearly in the case of the border dispute between Morocco and Algeria in 1963, after the deterioration of the situation between the two sides initiated the Secretary-General’s invitation to the Arab League Council in an extraordinary session to discuss the dispute.
There is no doubt that if the initiative of the Secretary-General’s invitation to the Arab League Council in a special session to discuss the dispute Algerian Moroccan, had come mainly from the text determined by Article 20 of the rules of procedure of the Council, and this is the first time that the resort where the Secretary-General to use his right under this article However, what distinguishes the initiative of the Secretary-General to develop this style intervention, as was done but did not achieve the desired success, and these were adopted by the Secretariat prior to the same sort of expansion of the Council’s invitation to convene.

In general played a personal role to the Secretary-General in the political development of the efficiency of the Arab League in dealing with Arab disputes, in many cases, the Secretary General role of mediation, investigation and contact the parties to the conflict even before a formal mandate from the Council. This result supports the study by Professor behavioral "Arenas Haas," and his colleagues on the management of conflict in regional organizations, including the League of Arab States, has completed the study to the Arab League characterized the centrality of the role of the Secretary-General in the settlement of disputes, where the settlement was only one case without effective intervention of the Secretary General a situation of conflict between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic in 1958, and that the Secretariat had efforts compromise in the settlement of some Arab disputes in the bud before it explodes and publicly announces.
And despite the objective conditions that caused the growing political role of the Secretary-General at the settlement of differences and disputes Arabia, the growing role often subjected to criticism by some Member States and is in fact the phenomenon back to the early years of the Arab League, and it is not limited to the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, but almost found in most international organizations.

The second paragraph: the role of diplomatic summits in the Arab settlement of disputes Arabic:

The periodic meetings of heads of States and the Arab governments were useful in the peaceful settlement of disputes that may arise between the Arab countries because the opportunity to meet with leaders and Arab leaders, which means attending meetings of the conflicting parties to the Summit had given the appropriate opportunity to help through a third party ready to bring the points of view Parties conflicting, as the climate summits have created the opportunity for direct personal diplomacy of Heads of State, and therefore, we find that for the summit session actor in the peaceful settlement of disputes, especially if the parties to the conflict were present at the conference, and in the case could not collect the parties to the conflict need to be a party third attempt to reach a settlement.
Thus Arab League of Arab States introduced the Arab summit as a diplomatic tool Arab dispute settlement, reflecting the Arab League’s ability to adapt to new circumstances, has played kings and meetings of heads of Arab States played a pivotal role in the settlement of disputes through two:
First picture: summits to create the appropriate atmosphere for understanding between the heads of States parties to the conflict, even if the objective of the meeting was to settle the dispute, for example, paved the first Arab summit meeting in 1964 with a meeting of the Egyptian-Saudi Yemeni settlement of the crisis, and to meet with Algerian-Moroccan to resolve the crisis between the two countries. In other words, the League of Arab States is the function of "communication" between the Arab leaders thus pave for the settlement of disputes.
– 1976 for the consideration of the civil war in Lebanon, a meeting which resulted in a final composition of the Arab deterrent forces in Lebanon.
In addition to the Arab summit conferences, meetings play Arab League Council at the level of foreign ministers influential role in the study of the outstanding issues in preparation for submission to the summit aimed at finding a peaceful settlement of disputes Arabic.



Chapter Two: the League of Arab States and the settlement of disputes:
So that we can learn from the success of the League of Arab States in the settlement of disputes that may arise among its members, and we see that, if we refer briefly to the characteristics of Arab disputes, as such disputes are characterized by a set of privacy makes it distinct from the other, which makes finding a solution is in extremely difficult and complex, and these characteristics can be summarized in the following table which gives some examples of disputes Arabic and some points that contribute to highlight their privacy:
Settled role of the Arab League regulations conflicting nature limbs history of the conflict
The triumph of one of the parties is limited - 1948
The Egyptian-Saudi mediation did not intervene League Central - Central - Syria - Lebanon 1949
United Nations did not intervene Arab League progressive - Central Context Egypt - Sudan 1958
Establishment of the mixed commission for the demarcation of the border send emergency Arab forces did not mention any role progressive - Governor border Iraq - Kuwait 1961
Bilateral agreement call for the formation of the mediation committee governor - progressive border Morocco - Algeria 1963
Bilateral agreement role of the Secretary-General in the establishment of the mediation center - Context progressive u Yemen - Yemen c 1972
Charter Taif agreement played a role of the Secretary-General for the agreement of the parties - - Lebanese civil war of 1975
United Nations did not intervene Arab League progressive - Governor border Iraq - Kuwait 1990
Source

Through this table can be noted that Arab disputes are privacy following:
– Most of these disputes are disputes resolved border which makes difficult diplomatic means, so it is possible for the Arab League to put an expensive Arab border demarcation between all Arab countries known disputes thereon in the light of the conflicting parties agree and all Arab countries.
– These disputes in most disputes between systems and regulations to maintain progressive, threatening to expand the conflict regulated Progressive States to support its ally, as well as vice versa, if only by voting in the organs of the Arab League, in addition, the unit which increases in these conflicts, the intervention forces Great in the conflict - especially before the collapse of the Soviet Union - which makes it difficult to find a solution to the dispute.
– Such disputes are frequent disputes, since the conflict, as it did not solve the first time actually to show the rave of the new (Iraqi conflict situation - Kuwaiti).
Finally, it may be noted that such disputes are often resolved outside the framework of the Arab League either by resorting to the bilateral agreement or to other international or regional organizations.
And if these simple references to some of the characteristics of Arab conflicts, to what extent succeeded in resolving the Arab League?
Talk on the Arab League and its role in the settlement of conflicts requires, after access to the means of settlement as a result, the talk about successes and failures faced by the Arab League in its attempts to settle disputes and the reasons behind this success or failure.
Some Arab class conflicts through the Arab League to the four types:
§ conflicts did not interfere with the Arab League.
§ Conflicts tried to intervene and did not make.
§ Conflicts intervened, but the success was limited.
§ Conflicts intervened and the Arab League had success with high efficiency.

The success
 If we must talk about the success it is in the context of two types, is there really another success of effective and limited in the settlement of disputes by the Arab League?

A - Contributed to the Arab League in the dispute settled with great efficiency:
Arab League has used many means and mechanisms in order to try to resolve conflicts-Arab, and it is what has been talking about earlier. But is succeeded this means, whether original or updated so to speak, in a final solution to some of these disputes?
Through many writings, which talked about the Arab League’s role in resolving local disputes, shows that the assessment of these researchers in this area, often goes to a positive role in the final settlement of certain disputes such as: the Iraqi conflict - Kuwait in 1961 and the Lebanese civil war in 1975, and as well as its role in resolving the crisis between reunification in 1972.

And regardless of the debate that may be going on the means used to solve such conflicts, whether it is the means set forth in the Charter or a concluding work of the Arab League of evolution in the area of the settlement, the legality of the latter, regardless of all this, the recognition of the existence of effort real and clear by the Arab League in resolving disputes mentioned above, the issue is indisputable, but whether these efforts / means these conflicts have ended already? Or is it only has doused until?
For the conflict and the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border, which was the phenomenon, and despite a settlement and the intervention forces emergency Arab, has re-emerged in 1973, and the Arab League intervened again, and its Secretary-General’s efforts resulted in the creation of a mixed commission to demarcate the border, but Iraq and Kuwait did not end the dispute, in spite of all this, levied tribute conflict again, if the other conditions and other forms, this time in 1990 and is still the day, and perhaps the future.
And for the Lebanese crisis, despite what was done by the Arab League and its secretary general - in particular - to resolve the crisis (a cease-fire agreement), the evolution of events led to its collapse and thus escalating the crisis and then a meeting of foreign ministers, and recognizing the role of the Arab League commissioned the Secretary-General to stay in contact with the parties, which led to arriving at peace agreements paved to calm the crisis.
Despite all this, the civil war with all its repercussions, and their impact on the region continued to the post for many years to the extent of the Charter of Taif.
The crisis between the two parts of Yemen, which is the border, like most Arab conflict, as the Secretary-General has played an important role to assist the special committee to achieve reconciliation, and resulted from these efforts to resolve the dispute, but encouraged them to the Unit (any agreement) during the discussions that took place between them, and the agreement was signed in the same year (1972). But controversy returned again in 1979, no peace treaty has been the border problem and not the European Convention led to the formation of a Yemeni one, but what we are witnessing now (ie, the existence of the State of Yemeni one) is the product of scenario events ended very violently between the two sides, so the outcome of Unity to the will of the victor.
Through these examples and these scenarios appears to us that what some call the work of the Arab League in resolving some conflicts effectively is merely a bid, the League of Arab States, led only to extinguish these disputes pending.
This raises the following question in this type of conflict, and which has the designation - which the Arab League disputes intervened efficiently - in this kind of conflict, does the Arab League actually play in resolving it? Or is it only has managed? , Which led to comfort her, but also then explode again
Hence, if the Arab League’s role has been limited to crisis management rather than resolve them, it can be said that such attempts, which coincided with the beginning of the dispute, they just missed opportunities.

B - disputes the success of the Arab League was limited by:
Pursuit of the same logic, namely, the existence of success on two levels: it is hard to go with the fact that classification to the end, with some consider sorts of successes high efficiency, and some consider other limited success, and vice versa, but is limited success may be considered in the view of some failure.
We will assume that the limited success of the Arab League was due mainly to the limited role, but, failing to resolve this dispute or that for one reason or another, as the West Bank in 1950, the Moroccan dispute - Algerian in 1963.
In the West Bank, considered the crisis as the first real crisis facing the Arab League, and resulted from the Jordanian Parliament resolution annexing the West Bank to Jordan, which resulted in the bulk of the opposition to the Arab League, and after taking reply, and to engage in legal Mazes, and even claim the expulsion of Jordan. What resulted from all this problematic, as a matter of representing the Palestinians, and the competent bodies within the Arab League to consider the legal issues, after all this, the Arab League reached a compromise through its Political Committee, a result of it, Jordan pledged to the fact that the annexation issue is temporary Pending final settlement of the Palestinian issue, this result, although it things calmed down somewhat among Member States, but maintained the problem (the West Bank, Palestinian representative), since Jordan was protesting the presence of All-Palestine government, and support from some party members and attending meetings Arab League, and was invoked after the PLO since as construction, legitimate representative and guardian of the Palestinian people, therefore detect settlement has been very limited.
As for the dispute Moroccan - Algerian in 1963, the Arab League Council held an extraordinary meeting in October 19 this year, issued a decision calling on the two countries to withdraw their forces to previous positions, with the composition of the mediation committee to take appropriate resolution of the conflict by peaceful means, objected to Morocco This resolution for certain reasons, which led to the failure of the initiative, and therefore the failure of the Arab League’s role, and move the conflict to other destinations. But direct contact between the leaders of the two countries at the summit in Cairo in 1964, was beginning to take measures to end the conflict. These limitations, if not failure to success, in fact, is the characteristic that marked the Arab League’s role in the settlement of disputes Arab in general.
We have noted that the full success in the settlement of the bulk, if not all conflicts, which described the Arab League’s role in resolving it has been effective and decisive, not merely to be in the final outcome only a limited role, like the rest of other conflicts, which we talked about in the context of the last division. And this can be described what was called the positive role of the Arab League in dealing with some Arab disputes as a limited role in general, and if we consider that the suppression or calm some conflicts is mitigation.
Of course, a limited feature is the importance of this role, which could be considered positive (trespassing), as some real failure of this role as well as the level of other disputes.
Before talking about this failure could put the following question: Is the Arab League already qualified to resolve this conflict once and for all, a comprehensive means available under international and regional circumstances of each conflict? Then, if we recognized we had limited success, this success was upgraded by not provided for in the Charter, Is this really means developed at the level of such conflicts and their objectivity, but conditions and the region in general? Or they were deficient in that?
 The failure
Although the means available to the Arab League in settling disputes - without regard to the lack of Article V of the Charter - especially methods developed, both the good offices of the Secretary-General or diplomatic summits, but, with that contribution has been the League of Arab States in the settlement of disputes Arab - Arab irrelevant compared to the other methods.
Through studies carried out in this framework found that during the period between 1945 and 1981 amounted to resolve Arab disputes through bilateral agreement between the parties percentage of 84.32%, and the mediation of an Arab country, the proportion of 10.44%, while the role of the Arab League at a rate of 8.95% . This last figure shows us how limited role played by the Arab League in the settlement of disputes. There is a conflict which did not intervene, and there are conflicts intervened but without achieving any success in the little settlement, and from the narrative of some of these conflicts, we will try to identify the reasons why the Arab League ’s contribution to the settlement of conflicts Arabic - Arabic these misguided.
A - disputes the Arab League did not intervene in the settlement:
And we mean this range of disputes, which are completely ignored by the Arab League and did not play any role - not soon, not from afar - in attempts to resolve it, and Jun Syrian-Lebanese conflict in 1949, and the second Gulf War that showed the Arab League vulnerable large deficit and never confront the situation.
On March 10, 1949, a group of soldiers entered the Syrians on board the Syrian army and cars have killed one Palestinian collaborators with Israel, was arrested by gendarmes Lebanese, and Lebanon started investigation, and that was a declaration of the start of the crisis the Syrian-Lebanese relations.
And noted that this dispute resolved found outside the League of Arab States, as the Syrian-Lebanese conflict has not provided within the Arab League Council, and the Secretary-General did not intervene at all in this conflict, as was the resolution of the dispute through the mediation of Egyptian - Saudi Arabia.
And note that during the discussions between the parties to the conflict, Lebanon suggested in its report to the tribunal, the need to refer to the sentence, the Charter of the United Nations and in particular Article (33) to the exclusion of any mention of the Charter of the Arab League. However, Syria objected to the proposal, and therefore suggested reference to the Charter of the Arab League as Rabat, which links between the two countries, but Lebanon refused, which led eventually to the sufficiency only mention the general principles of public international law together with the links of brotherhood and good neighborliness between the two sister countries.
And remain the most serious crisis faced by the Arab League, since its establishment, and that was a reason to raise many questions about the credibility and efficacy, and is the second Gulf war, and we do not argue that the fact that Iraq had breached the requirements of international law to attack a sovereign nation – Kuwait - the conflict from the text of Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations was logical to be resolved in the framework of the League of Arab States.
Tries during this crisis defined progress unprecedented in its history, as characterized by conflicts and differences among Arab leaders, particularly after the Cairo Conference, which marked its Oscillation in attitudes between refusal and acceptance, not even one of the Arab leaders went to the futility Cairo meeting on the grounds that the agenda is not clearly defined, with the debate turning on the Gulf crisis to speak on the subject of transfer of the headquarters of the Arab League of Tunis to Cairo, the headquarters move is the subject, most of the settlement of a dispute between two-Arab members of the Arab League? Or that this was not implicit recognition of the Arab League - Arab countries - incapable of settling the dispute.
B - disputes intervened Arab League without success in the process of settlement:
It is those disputes that the Arab League has tried to play a certain role in the process of settlement but they have not achieved any success negligible, and we mean that the Arab League’s role in the crisis of Yemen in 1948 and the Egyptian-Sudanese conflict in 1958.
We have seen the civil war that broke out in Yemen in 1948, the first conflict in which the Arab League intervened, as it disputes that the Arab League did not show significant efficiency settled, it ended one victory of the crisis between disputing parties and the Arab League did not make any proposals, and not to any attempts to resolve the crisis, and all it did was envisaged through - just - identification recognized by the representative of the Yemeni people within the Arab League.
And Similarly, the Arab League has shown a clear incompetence of the settlement of the dispute Egyptian - Sudanese planning that has arisen around the border between the two countries in February 1958, has failed Arab diplomacy at the bilateral level or at the Arab League level in the settlement of the conflict, when a representative of the Sudan memorandum to the Secretary General of the League of Arab States, did not try the latter request a Arab League Council in an extraordinary session, and did not initiate any request for convening an Arab League Council, and not just intervene in the settlement of the dispute. And had tried Secretariat of the League to justify this position by saying that Sudan had not asked the Arab League council, held that merely notify the Secretary-General of the United allowance his good offices.
According to this and that, the Sudanese side was not reassured by the Arab League as seen under the influence of Egypt, so after he filed a complaint to the Secretary-General, rushed to lodge a complaint to the Security Council, without waiting for the results of the good offices of the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.
Through progress, both in terms of - the success - or failure of the Arab League to settle disputes Arabic, we can observe that the League of Arab States remains unable to resolve what may arise from disputes between its members and for a number of reasons, apart from the palaces Charter with regard to mediation and Arbitration, there are other reasons can be summarized as follows:
Failure of the project of setting up an Arab court of justice: The Charter did not establish a special function for the peaceful settlement of disputes within the framework of the Arab League, except as indicated in Article 19 on the establishment of an Arab court of justice. Although this project was the subject of many resolutions and numerous meetings. Despite what is currently deliberating on the need to speed up the establishment of this body, we believe this will not happen on the ground that the reasons that prevented the establishment of over fifty years, are the same reasons that prevent the establishment now. Arab States did not reach the degree of political and social growth, and is not yet available solidarity and sense of belonging to the family of one international, and all that did not qualify because the rest of the international judge to settle their disputes even if the judge Arabs. , In other words, is not due to lack of reassuring Arab countries to the Arab ability of the judiciary to be set up to rule objectively, but it was not to reassure the Arab countries to judicial ruling means of settling the dispute. Believe that this judicial ruling, if issued against them, it would Masa dignity, while the diplomatic settlement conceal concessions parties to the conflict in the guise of political, it is not influenced by, and is not affecting dignity.
Arab diplomatic moves slow to settle regional disputes: And this is especially slow when compared with the move by the United Nations for the same purpose. For example, we find that in the dispute that erupted in 1958 24 1975 did not Council meets only six months after the beginning of the events.
And this is a slow moving one diplomat factors that contribute to the weakening of the ability of the Arab League to settle their disputes and not restrict the scope of regional, as is often the United Nations to take decisions on these disputes, and out of this impasse is advisable to operate the Arab League to intervene or at least meeting with the first signs of the conflict and not to wait for evolution to the closure of the border or military action, and so on.
Military measures: no secret to anyone that can be played within the military forces want it to be a tool for achieving security and peace within a specific area and not evidence of the role played by UN peacekeeping troops in most parts of the world, but that What we find is not within the Arab League since the Arab League did not intervene militarily only twice:

The first time, when formed emergency Arab forces sent to Kuwait; and the second time during the Lebanese civil war.

In the first case was unable international emergency Arab forces access to Kuwait, but after that was still the danger that threatens the State of Kuwait, and for which the force was established.
In the second case of emergency forces did not succeed in separating Arab parties interlocking intervened only after the Syrian forces in Lebanon, there is no bill for that Syrian military intervention, but after the meeting of the Arab Summit in December 1976, bestowed on Syrian military force international legitimacy.
Additionally, it is noticeable that the Arab League’s role is different - in terms of its effectiveness and performance - depending on the circumstances and stages undergone by the Arab relations - Arab, the Arab world dominated Whenever a degree of calm and reconciliation between Arab countries, as reflected in the Arab League Arab League strength and support, and vice versa. Perhaps the biggest proof of this, the outgrowth of a Arab League following the degradation of the Arab-Egyptian relations after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement, has led to serious repercussions not only with regard to job performance, but with respect to its structural, which is not happening before and since the establishment of the Arab League, and external interference, which is in an indirect result in impaired Arab League in the face of Arab disputes that are the subject of this intervention, as it is in such a situation is to dispute or situation or crisis is of three levels: the internal level or local level, regional level and the international level.
Factor relates to external intervention, the position of major countries during the cold war era and especially the position of the two superpowers of the conflict consideration Arab League, the ability of the Arab League depends in large part on the nature of trends in the foreign policy direction of the two superpowers conflict, the more the two super negative attitudes towards certain dispute Whenever the Arab League is unable to deal with it.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of mono-polar American dominant on all issues before the international level, the positions of the Arab League in the best of form in line with American attitudes away from the pulse of the Arab street interpretation of the ocean to the Gulf.
The issue now is highlighting the following: If this is the most important characteristics of diplomatic League of Arab States in the settlement of disputes, and these are the most important conditions that affect significantly negatively on the performance of the Arab League in the area of dispute settlement, we can conclude that the Arab League’s role in this regard will remain limited and marginal In general, which is making it necessary to the Arab League to reconsider its rules and charters completely, and the circumstances operate. With a view to enable them to achieve the required degree of harmonization with the facts of the reality of contemporary Arab and international levels, particularly at the present time, which speaks for it to be a regional alternative to the Arab League represents the Greater Middle East, which started advocated by the United States of America for the integration of Israel in its affiliations Regional and create an alternative gathering of the League of Arab States.
At the conclusion of this study saying we need fundamental to Professor Ahmed Rashidi reminiscent of the current status League, saying: "The Arab League is being developed, brings to mind the experience of the League of Nations, if the Second World War had ravaged this experiment after a quarter-century of it and resulted in the birth of Organization of the United Nations taking into account the lessons of the former Organization and experiences, the current state of relations Arab imposes take a similar step. "

Like the Berlin Wall…
by Ghiath Nasser
The Palestinian people and the State of Israel
have been locked in nearly continuous armed struggle—lacking a
meaningful peace process, and prompting extreme actions all around. In
2002, Israel began constructing the Wall separating Israel from the
Occupied Territories; in early 2006, the Palestinians elected a Hamas
government. Both sides act as if they want to punish the other. In the
last seven years, few confidence-building measures have been taken;
neither side is making the necessary efforts to solve the conflict.


Israel’s actions will likely have more severe and far-reaching
consequences than those of its Palestinian neighbour. Palestinian
parliamentary elections are held every four years, and voters can
remove Hamas from power. But there is no infrastructure or intention to
re-examine the route of the Wall every four years. It seems the barrier
will remain for many years to come.


The 760 km-long barrier stands mainly on Palestinian lands,
significantly affecting the every-day life of many Palestinians,
especially in the Jerusalem area. Though its declared purpose was to
separate Israelis from Palestinians, in reality, the barrier in
Jerusalem separates Palestinians from Palestinians.


241,000 Palestinians – Muslims and Christians – live in East Jerusalem,
making up 33% of the city’s population. 30 days after the occupation of
East Jerusalem in 1967, Israel extended its jurisdiction to East
Jerusalem. Insufficient attention was devoted to the ramifications of
this hasty action, and the border that was drawn is very problematic.


Jerusalem’s Arab neighbourhoods are an integral part of the city.
Residents are dependent on Jerusalem in all aspects of life—from
education and healthcare, to employment, commerce and community life.
However, the 1967 border left entire neighbourhoods outside the
municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, and residents were issued the orange
ID cards of the Occupied Territories. In addition, certain
neighbourhoods, such as Tsur Baher, Jabal Mukaber and Beit Hanina were
divided into two: one part left outside the city’s borders, the other
remaining inside. In this absurd situation, a resident could hold an
orange West Bank ID, while their relative from the same neighbourhood
holds a blue Israeli ID.


Israel opted to build the Wall in Jerusalem along the 1967 border,
rather than the internationally recognised 1949 "Green Line." Now that
the Wall is being erected, the problematic nature of this border is
becoming more and more apparent, as is the increasing impact on
Palestinian residents.


The Wall cuts off Palestinians in East Jerusalem from their Palestinian
brothers in the West Bank, who have always regarded Jerusalem as their
spiritual, cultural and religious centre. The Wall bars these West Bank
residents from entering Jerusalem, which has also devastated East
Jerusalem business owners, and undermined the economy. In desperation,
Palestinian residents of Jerusalem are leaving to seek their livelihood
elsewhere.


The Wall also separates Palestinian families. In Jabal Mukaber, the
Wall runs through the centre of the neighbourhood, leaving some
residents inside the city lines and others outside. Father is separated
from son as they find themselves on different sides of the Wall;
community and family life is interrupted, as relatives cannot meet, and
as Jerusalem – the core of their social gatherings – becomes
inaccessible. Houses left outside the Jerusalem boundaries stand
empty—abandoned by their inhabitants.


But the cry for help from Jabel Mukaber’s residents was not left
unheeded. In an act of goodwill, inhabitants of a nearby Jewish
neighbourhood, Armon Hanatziv, answered the call. Since 2004, these
Jewish neighbours have supported legal action taken to change the route
of the Wall, including a High Court appeal by Sheikh Saed residents,
whom I represent. Together with their Arab neighbours, these Jewish
residents await the High Court ruling, hoping that the Wall will be
rerouted, and contacting me almost daily for updates. These people have
long understood what many of their leaders still do not: peace must
start between individuals, as when an Israeli Jew feels the pain and
distress of his Palestinian neighbour, and actively helps him get back
on his feet. This kind of concern for your fellow man should be mutual,
regardless of geography, ethnicity, or religion. This is the only way
to build trust and bring about co-existence between Israelis and
Palestinians. This is the only way two peoples can live side-by-side in
peace and security.


It is time to stop these extreme actions that only serve to undermine
the interests of both peoples. We must use the window of opportunity
offered by the Annapolis summit and begin a continuous political
process that will lead to an historic reconciliation and comprehensive
resolution of the conflict. We hope that political developments will
put an end to the suffering of the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem,
and that this Wall, like the Berlin Wall, will ultimately fall.


###


* Ghiath Nasser is a human rights lawyer in Jerusalem and the Occupied
Territories. He has represented a number of Palestinian villages and
neighbourhoods in cases concerning the Israeli Wall. This article was
written for the Common Ground News Service, and can be accessed at
www.commongroundnews.org.


This article is part of a special series on the psychology of
separation, which examines the psychological, spiritual, and political
implications of physical and emotional barriers.


Source: The Common Ground News Service (CGNews), 17 January 2008, www.commongroundnews.org.<br />
Copyright permission is granted for publication.

From Madrid to Annapolis - peace conferences are not enough
Daoud Kuttab
 
Source: Jordan Times, 07 December 2007, www.jordantimes.com.
Copyright permission has been obtained for publication.
 
PRINCETON—As Palestinian and Israeli leaders were meeting at the Annapolis Naval Base last week for yet another attempt at peacemaking, I remembered how my journalistic career led me to cover the Madrid peace conference in 1991. I vividly remember how then-US Secretary of State James Baker had kept everyone in the dark about the location of the international meeting. Once he declared the site, many of us Palestinians felt a sense of jubilation at the looming discussions, even though the exact nature of the Palestinian delegation was still unknown until the last minute.

While there are some differences with Annapolis, the issues are still the same, and we’ve seen that conferences alone cannot bring peace.

""Both conferences took place against the backdrop of a violent Gulf War, and as it did more than a decade ago, the United States knows it has to offer something to its Arab allies.

Like Madrid, the key Annapolis organizer was the US Secretary of State. And just as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had to muster all her diplomatic skills to get the meeting off the ground, Baker had an even harder position with the hawkish Likud Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, his right-wing spokesman Benjamin Netanyahu and with the Palestinian leadership that Israelis considered to be "terrorists."

While Mahmoud Abbas was introduced at Annapolis as the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, during the conference in Madrid, the PLO was not even allowed to attend. It did, however, choose the Palestinian delegation, which was headed by one of its founders, respected Gazan doctor Haidar Abdel Shafi (who passed away at the age of 88 this past September). While the PLO was the most obvious absentee in Madrid, the Hamas leaders, who won the parliamentary elections in Palestine, and the Iranians were the most talked about absentees in Annapolis.

The potential for peace looks better now than it did in 1991, on paper at least. Not only is the PLO present, but the idea of a two-state solution has become acceptable to all. Rice said that a Palestinian state is in the national interest of the United States. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was quoted as saying that without a Palestinian state, Israel’s future will be in jeopardy.

Yet many Palestinians are much more sceptical now, simply because of so many past failures. Attending the Madrid conference felt essential, but the importance of summits has diminished as such forums have failed to produce results.

In the absence of a solid agreement and an effective plan (with teeth), dissent has been on the rise among Palestinians, who want independence from Israeli occupation and the ability to govern a sovereign, contiguous state. Some, seeing so many Jewish settlements dotting the West Bank, want to scrap the two-state solution and focus on a single, binational state.

Forty years after the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, including Jerusalem, Palestinians have yet to find the formula for liberation. They have attempted cross-border violence (late 1960s), Arab and international diplomacy (1970s and ’80s), the first Intifada (1987), secret talks in Oslo (1993), suicide attacks (throughout the 1990s that culminated in the second Intifada), cross-border rocket attacks (2006 and this year), regional Arab initiatives (2000 and this year), international initiatives and peace envoys (since 1967), but nothing succeeded.

The transcripts of conferences, peace initiatives, lofty speeches and UN agreements aimed at resolving the conflict could fill rooms. The reality is that Palestinian territories are still under foreign military occupation, in defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which states that it is inadmissible to occupy land by force.

Sceptics of US motives have good reason for concern. To overcome mistrust based on past failures, Bush will need to spend substantial political capital. In the early days of the Bush administration, the idea of using the cachet of the presidency was anathema because of former president Bill Clinton’s failed attempts to broker a peace agreement. But such high-level influence is critical today.

Palestinians can no longer afford a step-by-step approach, like the process that began in Madrid. In the past, plans employing incremental improvements were targets of extremists seeking dates and locations to use to derail the peace process. Consider what a radical Israeli citizen did to Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. Palestinian extremists have carried out suicide bombings and other horrific acts on the eve of Israeli elections and important redeployments, virtually guaranteeing the abandonment of Israeli withdrawal plans.

What is needed, as suggested in the Arab Peace Initiative and a number of Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives, is an agreed-upon final status—something like the 1967 borders—and a process to implement terms that will be agreed to by all parties. Otherwise, this and future summits will continue to fail.


*The writer, an award-winning Palestinian columnist, is currently the Ferris professor of journalism at Princeton University. He can be reached at dkuttab@princeton.edu. This article is distributed by the Common Ground News Service, and can be accessed at www.commongroundnews.org.<br />